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1 Introduction
The use of mathematical models in human demography dates back to the 1920's. In clas-
sical studies the models were linear (cf. Leslie [1945]). However, these classical models
ignore important aspects of the reproduction process, the main problem being that they
are based on age specic fertility and death rates for females only. In other words, the
mating process, that is, the forming of marriages, is ignored. This process plays a crucial
role in the reproduction of the human population, as the number of births is dependent on
the number of marriages. The number of marriages in each combination of age-groups of
males and females is aected by the total number of individuals in these age-groups, and
hence the number of births may depend on the size and age-structure of both the (mature)
male and female population in a non-trivial way. Thus, a realistic population theory should
incorporate a model that predicts how marriages are formed.
The recognition of this fact has lead to several attempts to formulate two-sex models,
see for example Pollard [1995] and the references therein. Unfortunately, the two-sex mod-
els proposed in the literature suer from a fundamental weakness in that the associated
marriage models are not derived explicitely from behavioral principles, although they are
constructed so as to fulll particular reasonable qualitative properties based on biologi-
cal and demographic considerations. Thus, from a theoretical viewpoint these models are
somewhat ad hoc.
This paper diers from previous analyses of two-sex models in that our point of departure
is a particular behavioral marriage model proposed by Dagsvik [1998] and Dagsvik et.al.
[1998]. Given this marriage model, the updating is described by the standard Markovian
schedule. But, in contrast to the classical models, it now follows that the model becomes
nonlinear. In general, such models can be very hard to analyze. However, during the last
few decades the mathematical theory of nonlinear dynamical systems has provided us with
a powerful apparatus that may be useful for revealing some of the structural properties of
such models.
The paper is organized as follows: First we give a short survey on demographic models,
and the qualitative properties of such models. Thereafter we give a brief presentation and
discussion of the marriage model due to Dagsvik [1998]. Based on this model, we derive a
demographic model for the number of women and men in specic population groups at a
given time, and examine the dynamical properties of this particular model.
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2 Demographic Population models
We will at rst give a short summary on demographic models and the two-sex problem.
For a more extensive review we refer to Pollard [1995]. The rst models considered in the
literature were one-sex models, based on female reproduction rates. Such models may work
well if the population of men and women in each age group are of similar sizes, but may
yield rather poor results in the case of imbalances between the population sizes of men and
women, cf. Pollak [1990].
2.1 The Leslie model
In classical stable population theory the female population (at time t) is represented by a
vector
F (t) = (F
1
(t); ::::; F
n
(t))
where F
i
(t) is the number of females of age i at time t. The description of how the population
evolves over time has two 'building blocks'; namely a vector of survival rates  = (
1
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n
),
where 
n
= 0 (n is the maximum age of an individual in the population), and birth or fertility
rates described by a vector 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1
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n
). Thus the number of newborn (females) at time
t + 1 may be represented by a linear combination of the F
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Furthermore, the population is updated according to the (agening) relation
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The matrix L is called the Leslie-matrix named after P.H.Leslie who was a pioneer on this
subject, cf. Leslie [1945]. In the original version of the Leslie model, L is assumed to be
constant. If the population converges towards a constant level, we say that the matrix
equation (2.1) has a (stable) equilibrium. If the population return to an earlier state after
a nite number of generations we say that the equation has a periodic orbit. In some
circumstances (particularily those cases where no equilibria or periodic orbits are present)
it may also be of great interest to detect whether the population grows at a constant rate
or not. This issue has been investigated by Keytz [1972] and others.
Mathematically, there is no big dierence between xed and periodic points. If the
population returns to an earlier state after a nite number of generations it has a periodic
orbit. A xed point is a periodic point of period 1. In the case of the Leslie model, periodic
orbits satsify the equation
L
p
F = F
where p  1 denotes the period. Since the matrix L is non-negative, the properties of the
periodic points are described by a theorem due to Perron & Frobenius (cf. Keytz [1972]).
Specically, there are two possibilities: If all the eigenvalues of L are real, the long term
behavior of the system is described by the eigenvalue 
0
having the largest absolute value.
If 
0
< 1, the population will eventually become extinct. If 
0
> 1, the population will grow
towards innity with a constant rate equal to 
0
. In the case 
0
= 1, the population will
converge towards a stable equilibrium. In the case of complex eigenvalues (which all have
to occur in conjugated pairs since L is real), the limit behavior of the system is a periodic
orbit, with period equal to the number of complex eigenvalues plus one, that is, the period
has to be an odd number.
Notice that the trivial (and stable) equilibrium F = 0 is always a solution of the equation
LF = F . In one-sex models this trivial equilibrium F = 0 is 'uninteresting', while in the
two-sex case to be considered next, the existence of trivial solutions usually makes the task
of nding non-trivial equilibria by means of xed point theorems more dicult.
2.2 Two-sex models
In one-sex models the number of ospring is only dependent on the number of females.
In many cases this may seem like a plausible assumption, as, at least in theory, even one
individual male can produce enough sperm to impregnate millions of females. This particular
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setting is consistent with female dominance, namely that there are always enough males
to fertilize all females. For species where only a handful of males is sucient to ensure
a successful reproduction, the fate of most of the males is in this context unimportant.
However, in populations with monogamy, as in most human societies, the role of the mating
process becomes important.
In populations without female dominance a common phenomenon is marriage squeeze,
in which the reproduction is limited by the availability of the scarcer sex. This phenomenon
is well known even in human populations despite the fact that the overall sex ratio never
deviates far from unity. Patterns of preferences for age, education, etc., may also contribute
to the marriage squeeze. Thus, in populations without female dominance, both sexes must be
incorporated in order to provide an appropriate representation of the population dynamics.
The main dierence between one-sex and two-sex models (except from the introduction
of the second sex) is that the birth and survival schedules no longer are assumed to be
constant, but depend on the size of the population, and its age-sex composition. The
number of births is dependent on the number of marriages, and the number of ospring
produced by a married female may not only depend on her age, but also on the age of her
mate. In addition, the behavior of males and females in the marriage market is dependent
on the size of the respective age classes of (single) men and women.
This implies a non-linear model, in which the mating rule, describing how marriages
are formed, becomes an important element. Caswell and Weeks [1986] studied a two sex
model under particular assumptions about the mating behavior. In fact, they analyzed
several possible forms of the mating function. Chung [1994] extended the study by Caswell
and Weeks, and made a more thorough analysis of the dynamics, showing that interesting
dynamical behavior may occur also at \realistic" parameter levels, in contrast to Caswell
and Weeks who used rather extreme parameter values.
We will now describe the two-sex modelling framework formally. As in one-sex models
the population is divided into n age groups or categories. The population at time t may be
described by a (2n)-vector (M(t); F (t)), where
M(t) = (M
1
(t); :::;M
n
(t))
represents the male population, and as above
F (t) = (F
1
(t); :::; F
n
(t))
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represents the female population. The number of births is dependent on the number of
marriages. In traditional demographic studies one has usually assumed that the mating
function has a particular form, based on dierent biological considerations (see Caswell and
Weeks [1986]), in contrast to the present approach, which is, as mentioned above, based on
a particular behavioral marriage model to be described in section 3.
Let 
ij
be the expected number of female ospring of a male in age group i married to
a female from age group j. If now  is the rate of male to female newborns (the sex ratio,
assumed to be constant), then 
ij
is the expected number of male ospring produced by
a couple where the male has age i and the female has age j. Now let (M;F ) denote the
mating rule or marriage function, that is, the matrix function predicting the number of
marriages in each age combination as a function of the number of single men and women in
each age group, represented by the vectors M and F . Entry (i; j) in the matrix (M;F ) is
denoted by 
ij
(M;F ), and is equal to the number of marriages between males in age group
i and females in age group j. As indicated above, the functions f
ij
g may be non-linear.
From the above considerations the number of newborn at time t+ 1 may be expressed as:
F
1
(t+ 1) =
X
ij

ij

ij
(M(t); F (t))(2.2)
and
M
1
(t+ 1) = F
1
(t+ 1):
The agening of the population follows from the (linear) recursion formula:
M
i
(t+ 1) = 
M
i 1
M
i 1
(t)(2.3)
for i = 2; :::; n, and
F
j
(t+ 1) = 
F
j 1
F
j 1
(t);(2.4)
for j = 2; :::; n, where 
M
i
; 
F
j
are the survival rates of males of age i and females of age j,
respectively. The above relations dene a vector function g = (g
1
; :::; g
n
; g
n+1
; :::; g
2n
) by
M
i
(t+ 1) = g
i
(M(t); F (t))
for i = 1; :::; n, and
F
j
(t + 1) = g
n+j
(M(t); F (t))
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for j = 1; :::; n. Hence we get a dynamical system where the population is updated according
to the recursive equation
(M(t + 1); F (t+ 1)) = g(M(t); F (t)):(2.5)
Due to certain biological and mathematical considerations, several authors have suggested
that the mating function (:) should satisfy a number of criteria or axioms, including the
following (see McFarland [1972] and Pollard [1995]):
A1. (M;F ) is dened for all (non-negative) vector combinations (M;F ).
A2. (M;F )  0 for all M  0; F  0.
A3.
P
i

ij
(M;F )  F
j
and
P
j

ij
(M;F )  M
i
. The number of marriages involving
members of one category can not exceed the total number of members in that category.
A4. The number of marriages should depend heavily on the ages of the males and females.
A5. 
ij
is non-decreasing in M
i
and F
j
, and strictly increasing for some values of M
i
and
F
j
(A larger population yields more marriages than a smaller one).
A6. 
ij
is non-increasing (and over some interval a strictly decreasing) function ofM
r
; F
s
; r 6=
i; s 6= j.
A7. The negative eect on 
ij
of an increase in M
s
should be greater than the negative
eect on 
ij
of an equivalent increase in M
r
if s is closer to i than r is. Likewise with
the sexes interchanged.
A8. (M; 0) = (0; F ) = 0. The extinction of one sex inevitably rules out the possibility
of a marriage, eventually making the population extinct.
A9.  is continuous in M and F (some authors assume the mating function to be dened
only on the integers. However, mathematically, it may be convenient to extend the
denition of the mating function to the positive real numbers as well).
A10. (M; F ) = (M;F ) (homogenity).
In most papers on two-sex models, the mating function is assumed to be on a particular
closed form (see for example Caswell and Weeks [1986] or Pollard [1995]). Typical explicit
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function forms that have beeen applied in the particular case with no age structure are
summarized in the following table:
Table1: Dierent marriage models discussed in the literature
(M;F ) interpretation
F Female dominance.
M Male dominance.
aM + (1  a)F , where 0 < a < 1. Weighted mean.
k
M+F
2
. Arithmetic mean.
k(M  F )
1
2
. Geometric mean.
2kMF
M+F
. Harmonic mean.
kminfM;Fg. Minimum.
In this table k > 0 is a suitable real constant to be determined (by data). Notice that in
the case where (M;F ) = kminfM;Fg (minimum), there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the number of marriages (births) and the availability of the scarcer sex. As men-
tioned by Pollard [1995], most of these functions have serious aws, and Pollard nds the
harmonic mean to be the most interesting. The two-sex model examined by Caswell and
Weeks [1986] and Chung [1994] was based on this mating function. In the general case with
age-structured populations, Pollard [1995] and others have proposed the following extension
of the harmonic mean function, namely

ij
(M;F ) =

ij
M
i
 F
j
P
r

ri
M
r
+
P
r

rj
F
r
;
where f
ij
g; f
ri
g and f
rj
g are parameters. The main weakness of all these functions is
that they are not derived from a theory about individual behavior. In other words, they
are ad hoc from a theoretical point of view. As mentioned above, our aim in this paper
is to investigate the dynamical properties of the above two-sex model when the mating
rule (marriage model) is based on a particular behavioral theory, to be introduced below.
However, before we present our marriage model, we shall give a brief survey of some relevant
material from the theory of dynamical systems.
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2.3 A short review of some aspects of the theory of dynamical
systems that are relevant when studying two-sex models
An important purpose when analyzing dynamical systems is to reveal the long term or
asymptotic behavior of the system. In particular, it is of interest to examine the structure of
the xed and periodic points (equilibria), a task which may be dicult. There are two types
of equilibria that are found interesting in (human) demography. One is the case of a constant
growth of the population, while the other is the case of the population remaining unchanged
over time. The last case is called a proper equilibrium. If the population returns to an earlier
state after a nite number of generations we say that it possesses a periodic orbit. Both
proper equilibria and periodic orbits (and other interesting dynamical phenomena as well)
have been observed in many animal populations, while among human beings, it seems like
most populations grow constantly. But even if we are not able to control the population size,
it may be of great importance to understand to which extent the structural parameteres
aect the growth of the population. Hence, in many circumstances, the conditions for a
'constant growth' equilibrium may be the most interesting.
The trivial equilibrium is always a possibility in (realistic) demographic models (if the
population enters the state of extinction, then it will remain extinct forever). This may
complicate the analysis, since the model can still have non-trivial equilibria which may be
hard to nd, especially when these equilibria are unstable.
In the nonlinear case, one may sometimes generalize the techniques provided by the
Perron-Frobenius theorem. The main idea is rst to detect (all the) xed and periodic
points of the map describing the system. Thereafter, the linearization of the map, that
is, the Jacobian matrix of the map evaluated at the xed or periodic point, is computed.
The dynamics of the model in a neighborhood of the equilibrium is determined by the
spectrum (the set of eigenvalues) of the linearization. This is due to the following theorem
(cf. Hartman [1964]):
Theorem (Hartman-Grobman): In a neighborhood of a hyperbolic xed (periodic) point
a dynamical system is topologically conjugated to its linearization, determined by its Jacobian
matrix evaluated at the xed or periodic point.
Remark: Two dynamical systems are called topologically conjugated if their xed points
(equilibria) and periodic orbits have the same structure. A xed (periodic) point of a linear
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system is called hyperbolic whenever none of its eigenvalues have absolute value (modulus)
equal to one, that is, none of the eigenvalues are lying on the unit circle in the complex
plane. Thus, in a neighborhood of a hyperbolic xed point p, every non-linear map g may
be approximated by the linear map x 7! Dg(p)x, where Dg(p) denotes the Jacobian matrix
of g evaluated at p. The dynamics of this linear system may be analyzed by traditional
eigenvalue analysis. In practice one may not know whether the xed point is hyperbolic
or not, but by computing the Jacobian, and nding its eigenvalues, one may conclude that
hyperbolicity of the linearization must imply hyperbolicity of the original system, and vice
versa.
In the nonlinear case, the number of possible combinations of the eigenvalues is in gen-
eral large, depending on the dimension of the model (number of age groups). The invariant
manifold theorem (cf. Hirsch et.al. [1977]) tells us that the map dening the model is
contracting or expanding in the direction of an eigenvector according to whether the cor-
responding eigenvalue has absolute value smaller or greater than one. The behavior of the
model will also vary, depending on whether this eigenvalue is real or complex. Complex
eigenvalues always occur in conjugated pairs since the Jacobian is a real matrix. The case
of a real eigenvalue of multiplicity larger than one must also be explicitely treated. If the
absolute value of an eigenvalue is equal to one, the map is neither contracting nor expanding
along the corresponding eigenvector, and we say that the map possesses a center manifold
(see for example Guckenheimer and Holmes [1983]).
The (general) two-sex modeling framework outlined above, is dependent on a parameter
set including the birth rates 
ij
, the survival rates 
i
, and the sex ratio at birth, . When the
parameters vary in a domain, the dynamical behavior of the model may change. Parameter
values at which such a change take place are called bifurcation points, and the process the
system undergoes at such a point is called a bifurcation. In theory, there are several types of
bifurcations a dynamical system may undergo as the parameters vary. It is an interesting,
but in general very dicult task to classify these.
During the last couple of decades much attention has been given to the possibility of a
dynamical system becoming chaotic. Loosely speaking, this means that all of the equilibria
becomes unstable, and that the system becomes sensitive to initial conditions, making it
impossible to predict future population sizes. Numerical simulations using the Caswell-
Weeks model show that large enough values of the parameters can destabilize the equilibrium
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in age and sex structure, making their model chaotic (cf. Chung [1994]).
3 A two-sex marriage model derived from a particular
matching game
In this section we shall discuss a particular model derived from assumptions about the
behavior in the marriage market. In this market each man and woman (agent) is assumed
to behave according to specic rules as follows. Each man and woman are supposed to
have sucient information about the potential partners so as to be able to establish a
preference list, that is, a list which ranks all potential partners, including the alternative of
being single. The matching process towards equilibrium takes place in several stages. There
are no search costs, and the men and women have no information about the preferences
of potential partners, which means that they are ignorant about their own chances in the
market. Either the women or the men make oers, that is, if the men make the oers, no
woman is allowed to make an oer and vice versa. A man is acceptable to a woman if the
woman prefers to be matched to that particular man rather than staying single. A matching
between a male and female who are not mutually acceptable, which means that at least one
of the agents would prefer to be single rather than be matched to the other, is said to be
blocked by the unhappy agent. A matching  such that there exist a male and female who
are matched to each other, but who prefer each other to their assignment at , given the
rules of the game, is said to block the matching . We say that a matching  is stable if it
is not blocked by any individual or pair of agents.
Gale and Shapley [1962] (cf. Roth and Sotomayor [1990]) have demonstrated that stable
matchings exist for every matching market. Specically, they proved that the so-called de-
ferred acceptance procedure produces a stable matching for any set of preferences provided
the ordering of the preferences are strict, that is, indierences are ruled out. This algorithm
goes as follows: Suppose the men make the oers. First each man make an oer to his
favorite woman. Thus a woman may receive oers from one or several men, or may receive
none oers at all. Each woman immediately rejects the oer from any man who is unac-
ceptable to her, and she rejects all but her most preferred among the acceptable oers too.
Any man whose oer is not rejected at this point is kept temporarily 'engaged' until better
oers arrive. At any step any man who was rejected at the previous step makes an oer to
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his next choice, that is, to his most preferred woman among those who have not yet rejected
him. Each woman receiving oers rejects any from unacceptable men, and also rejects all
but her most preferred among the new oers and any man she may have kept engaged from
the previous step. The game is terminated after any step in which no man is rejected. The
matches are now consummated with each man being matched to the woman he is engaged.
Based on the deferred acceptance algorithm Dagsvik [1998] obtained an aggregate model,
that is, a model for the number of marriages between men and women in each age group.
We shall now give a brief presentation of Dagsvik's model. For a more detailed presentation
and proofs, we refer to Dagsvik [1998].
We assume the preferences of the males and females are represented by latent utility
indicies. Now, let M
i
; i = 1; ::; n, be the number of (single) men in age group i, and
F
j
; j = 1; :::; n, the number of (single) women in age group j. We dene U
mf
ij
to be the
utility of male m in age group i of being married to female f in age group j. U
m
i0
is the
utility of male m in age group i of being single. Similarly, let U
fm
ji
be the utility of female
f of age group j of being matched to male m in age group i, and U
f
j0
the utility of female
f in age group j of being single. The utility functions are assumed to have the structure
U
mf
ij
= a
ij

mf
ij
; U
m
i0
= a
i0

m
i0
U
fm
ji
= b
ji

fm
ji
; U
f
j0
= b
j0

f
j0
where a
ij
; b
ji
are positive (non-negative) deterministic terms (preference parameters), and

mf
ij
; 
m
i0
; 
fm
ji
; 
f
j0
, are positive random variables which are supposed to account for unob-
servables that aect the preferences. Without loss of generality we may 'normalize' the
preference parameters for being single, that is, we let
a
i0
= b
j0
 1:
The random terms are assumed to be distributed according to the type I extreme value
distribution, with cumulative distribution function given by
P (
mf
ij
 y) = P (
m
i0
 y) = P (
fm
ji
 y) = P (
f
j0
 y) = exp( 1=y)
for y > 0. The extreme value distribution is of particular interest in this context because it
can be given a behavioral justication, and it is also tractable as it yields simple functional
forms.
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Given the above structure of the utility functions, Dagsvik [1998] demonstrates that the
asymptotic number of marriages between males in age group i and females in age group j;
X
ij
, can be expressed as
X
ij
=
c
ij
M
i
F
j
A
i
B
j
(3.1)
where A
i
and B
j
are determined by the follwong system of equations
A
i
= 1 +
X
k
c
ik
F
k
B
k
(3.2)
and
B
j
= 1 +
X
k
c
kj
M
k
A
k
(3.3)
for i = 1; ::::; n, and j = 1; ::::; n, and where c
ij
= a
ij
b
ji
. The respective number of single
males and females are given by
X
i0
=
M
i
A
i
(3.4)
and
X
0j
=
F
j
B
j
:(3.5)
From the above expressions (3.1),(3.2) and (3.3), we may derive a polynomial equation in
X
ij
of a degree dependent on the number of categories. Dagsvik [1998] demonstrated (by
means of traditional xed point techniques) that the system of equations (3.2) and (3.3)
always has a unique real and positive solution. However, expressing this solution on a closed
form is impossible in the general case. But, using numerical techniques it is straight forward
to solve these equations.
Dagsvik et.al. [1998] investigated whether or not the above marriage model satises the
Axioms A1-A7. Unfortunately, they were not able to prove whether or not A5 and A7 hold
in the general case. They also found that, in general, A6 does not hold. However, for their
particular estimates of the preference parameters, they did not nd any case where A1-A7
were violated. From the expression (3.1) it is also evident that Axiom A8 is satised, and
extending this formula to the real numbers makes the model continuous (dierentiable) as
well (Axiom A9). However, since A
i
and B
j
are dependent on the size of the male and
female populations, the model is not homogenous, that is, Axiom A10 is violated.
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In the special case where n = 1, that is, where there is only one category of males and
females, (3.1) reduces to
X =
1
2
[ +M + F  
p
( +M + F )
2
  4MF ];(3.6)
where  = 1=a,  = 1=b.
The above model (3.1) to (3.5) for the asymptotic number of marriages may be general-
ized by including the possibility of (feasible) contracts. A contract represents an agreement
between the agents when forming a marriage. In the present context, important contract
terms may for example be dierent residential locations. In the presence of exible contracts,
the quantity c
ij
is modied to:
c
ij
=
X
!
a
ij
(!)b
ji
(!)(3.7)
with a
ij
(!) and b
ji
(!) being the preference parameters of the men and women respectively,
under the contract !. For a more precise description of this case, we refer to Dagsvik [1998].
4 Properties of the demographic model based on our
marriage model
We will now examine the dynamics of a two-sex model of the form (2.5) based on the above
marriage model, that is, the asymptotic number of matches X
ij
represents the mating
function 
ij
in the expression (2.2). Thus, if (M(t); F (t)) is the (mature) population at
time t, the number of newborn females at time t+ 1 can be expressed as
F
1
(t + 1) =
X
ij

ij
X
ij
(M(t); F (t)):
To study the properties of the above behavioral marriage model, it is desirable to nd
realistic values of the preference parameters a
ij
and b
ji
(and the birth and survival rates 
ij
and 
F
i
and 
M
j
as well). However, from the purpose of assessing the qualitative properties
of the model, the choice of fa
ij
g and fb
ji
g may not be so critical. Our main purpose in
this paper is not to utilize the model to provide practical predictions, but to achieve a
better understanding of the dynamics of the model. When modeling human populations,
the assumption of one-year age groups lead to huge models. In our analysis we have, for
simplicity reasons, only considered the case where the number of age groups is equal to four
and ten, respectively.
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To detect (non-trivial) xed and periodic points (of a map g), we must solve an equation
of the form
g
n
(x) = x(4.1)
where g
n
denotes the composition of g with itself n times. However, solving such equations
are not always possible using analytical techniques, and numerical methods may fail as
well if the xed point is unstable (or semistable), that is, if the function g dening the
system is not contracting along all the eigenvectors. The possibility of several equilibria
makes the analysis even more complicated. Small variations in the model parameter may
change the system from converging towards the trivial equilibrium, to a system where each
orbit apparently tends towards innity, possibly indicating that if non-trivial equilibria or
periodic points exist, they are not stable. In such cases it may be more fruitful to go for an
alternative strategy, e.g. to use the possibility of reducing the dimension of the model.
Due to the standard (linear) agening structure in our model (2.3) and (2.4), we may
express the size of age class i at time t as a function of the number of newborn in year
t  i + 1, i.e.,
M
i
(t) = (
i 1
Y
k=1

M
k
)M
1
(t  i + 1);(4.2)
and
F
j
(t) = (
j 1
Y
l=1

F
l
)F
1
(t  j + 1);(4.3)
where 2  i; j  n. Hence, we may express the number of newborn as follows:
(M
1
(t+ 1); F
1
(t+ 1)) = (
X
i;j

ij
X
ij
(M(t); F (t));
X
i;j

ij
X
ij
(M(t); F (t))):(4.4)
Thus, by using (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4), we may reduce our original model to a (lagged) two-
dimensional model. If this model possesses a xed or periodic point, then this must be the
case for the original model too. We can even continue one step further: Since the sex ratio
at birth, , is assumed to be constant, a xed point of the above two-dimensional model
must be on the form (x; x). Hence we get a one-dimensional version of the model dened
by the map:
h(x) =
X
i;j

ij
X
ij
(x; 
M
1
x; ::::; (
n 1
Y
k=1

M
k
)x; x; 
F
1
x; :::::; (
n 1
Y
l=1

F
l
)x);(4.5)
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for x  0. One-dimensional models are simple from a computational point of view, and are
easy to analyse by means of graphical techniques. Much of the dynamics of the original
system may be deduced from the dynamics of the corresponding one-dimensional system.
Thus, the equilibria of the above one-dimensional model may be detected by pure graphical
analysis. They are all represented by the intersections between the graph of h(x) and the
line y = x. Specically, consider the marriage function (3.1), and the expressions (3.2) and
(3.3). At an equilibrium ~x of the one-dimensional map (4.5) (satisfying h(~x) = ~x), we have
F
j
= (
j 1
Y
k

F
k
)~x; M
i
= (
i 1
Y
k

M
k
)~x
whenever 2  i; j  n, and F
1
= ~x, M
1
= ~x. Thus we have
X
ij
=
c
ij
(
Q
j 1
k=1

F
k
)(
Q
i 1
k=1

M
k
)~x
2
A
i
B
j
(4.6)
where
A
i
= 1 + ~x
X
k

ik
B
k
(4.7)
and
B
j
= 1 + ~x
X
k

kj
A
k
(4.8)
for i; j = 1; :::; n, where

ik
= c
ik
(
k 1
Y
l=1

F
l
)
and

kj
= c
kj
(
k 1
Y
l=1

M
l
):
When ~x large ( 1), we may nd real constants ~
i
,
~

j
and r, 0 < r < 1 such that A
i
 ~
i
~x
r
and B
j

~

j
~x
1 r
. This may be veried by inserting the above expressions into the equations
(4.7) and (4.8), and by the fact that this system of equations possess a uniquely determined
solution. Thus, in this case the mating function X
ij
(4.6) is approximately equal to
X
ij

c
ij
(
Q
j 1
k=1

F
k
)(
Q
i 1
k=1

M
k
)~x
2
~
i
~x
r
~

j
~x
1 r
=
c
ij
(
Q
j 1
k=1

F
k
)(
Q
i 1
k=1

M
k
)
~
i
~

j
 ~x(4.9)
making the model almost linear (remember that h(x) is a linear combination of the X
ij
).
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This is conrmed by numerical simulations, which indicates that the graph of h(x) becomes
asymtotic linear when x increases. The main weakness of the above strategy is that the
original higher-dimensional system may have xed or periodic points which is not possible
to detect by examining the one-dimensional system, making the above analysis incomplete.
4.1 Results from numerical simulations
We have carried out a number of numerical simulations, with dierent number of age classes,
and dierent parameters (we have only varied the birth and death rates). First we simulated
a 20-dimensional model with 10 age groups of each sex. Secondly, we reduced the number
of categories to four of each sex, yielding an 8-dimensional model. In both cases, we have
reduced the dimension of the model to one as described above. Based on a number of
simulation experiments, the following pattern seems to emerge:
(i) The map h(x) given by (4.5) is almost linear.
(ii) h(x) is monotonic increasing (more newborn lead to more adults).
(iii) h(0) = 0, that is, 0 is a (stable) equilibrium.
(iv) There are parameter values (birth/death rates and preference parameters) for which
h does not possess non-trivial equilibria.
(v) h(x) is (almost) convex. More precisely, there is a K > 0 such that h(x) is convex for
all x 2 (0; K). On the other hand, given K > 0, one can always nd parameters such
that h(x) is convex for all x 2 (0; K).
(vi) There are parameter values for which h possesses (at least) one non-trivial equilibrium.
Since 0 is a stable equilibrium, and h(x) is convex, the smallest non-trivial equilibria
has to be unstable. As a consequence of the former observation, the smallest non-
trivial equilibrium x
0
must satisfy x
0
< K if it exists.
(vii) For some parameter values, there appears to be a set of x values such that h(x) is
concave. However, this is apparently not enough to guarantee a new intersection
with the line y = x, yielding a new non-trivial stable equilibrium. A more thorough
simulation experiment is needed to settle this question.
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(viii) Because of the almost linearity of h, the graph of h almost follow the line y = x for
some parameter values.
4.2 Discussion
From the above analysis, we may conclude that a stable, non-trivial equilibrium of our
population model does not seem to exist in the case where there are no transaction costs
associated with the dissolution of marriages. Hence, according to our model, the population
will either continue to grow until it reaches its biological carrying capacity, when a collapse
may occur (Malthus' principle), or (slowly) decrease until it becomes extinct. Since h is
almost linear, the growth of the population will also be almost linear, in accordance with
classical models. Thus, our analysis demonstrates that the case of a constant growing
population is not merely the result of a pure 'mathematical' construction, but may be a
consequence of the behavior of men and women in the marriage market.
The above analysis indicates that spectacular dynamical phenomena as cycles and chaos
does not occur in our model. The only type of bifurcation we have observed in the numerical
simulations is the birth of an unstable xed point. However, we must emphasize that our
analysis is based on a drastical simplication of actual realistic patterns.
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Appendix A: Inclusion of divorce rates
So far we have assumed the so-called Southern California life style, in which a marriage
can costlessly be dissolved after one year. This seems unrealistic in most populations, since
the cost associated with a divorce may often be rather high. One way to account for this
in the model is to introduce transaction costs into the model. This would induce 'state
dependence' in the model.
One way to relax the assumtion of costless dissolutions of marriages is to assume that
marriage dissolutions occur with some probability . We shall now outline this approach.
To this end let Y
M
ij
(t) denote the population of men of age i married to women of age j at
time t and
~
M
i
(t) the population of single men of age i in year t. Then
M
i
(t) =
~
M
i
(t) +
X
j
Y
M
ij
(t)(4.1)
is the total number of men of age i at time t. The number of single men of age i+1 at time
t + 1 is equal to the number of survived single men of age i at time t who do not marry in
(t; t + 1] plus the number of survived married men of age i at time t who divorce. Thus, if
we dene 
ij
to be the rate of divorce between men of age i and women of age j, we have
~
M
i+1
(t+ 1) = 
M
i
 [
~
M
i
(t) 
X
j
(X
ij
(
~
M(t);
~
F (t))  
ij
 Y
M
ij
(t))](4.2)
where, as above, X
ij
denotes the number of marriages (during one year),
~
F (t) is the available
women to the single men
~
M(t), and where as before 
M
i
is the survival rate of women of age
i. The sum is taken over all age-classes of women. The number of men of age i+ 1 married
to women of age j + 1 at time t + 1 is equal to the (survived) number of matches (new
marriages) between (single) men of age i and women of age j at time t plus the survived
number of marriages between men of age i and women of age j at time t who are not been
divorced during (t; t + 1]. In mathematical terms this yields:
Y
M
i+1;j+1
(t+ 1) = 
M
i
 [X
ij
(
~
M(t);
~
F (t)) + (1  
ij
)  Y
M
ij
(t)]:(4.3)
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To check that internal consistency holds, (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) yields:
M
i+1
(t+ 1) =
~
M
i+1
(t+ 1) +
X
j
Y
M
i+1;j+1
(t + 1)
= 
M
i
[
~
M
i
(t) 
X
j
(X
ij
(
~
M(t);
~
F (t)) + 
ij
 Y
M
ij
(t))]
+
X
j

M
i
 [X
ij
(
~
M(t);
~
F (t)) + (1  
ij
)  Y
M
ij
(t)]
= 
M
i
[
~
M(t) +
X
j
Y
M
ij
(t)]
= 
M
i
M
i
(t)
which is as required. Analogous to the above expressions we also have formulas for updating
the female population:
~
F
j+1
(t+ 1) = 
F
j
 [
~
F
j
(t) 
X
i
(X
ij
(
~
M(t);
~
F (t)) + 
ij
 Y
F
ji
(t))]
and
Y
F
j+1;i+1
(t+ 1) = 
F
j
 [X
ij
(
~
M(t);
~
F (t)) + (1  
ij
)  Y
F
ji
(t)]:
The above expressions may be used to dene a modied demographic model, in which the
mating function is equal to

ij
(M(t); F (t)) = Y
M
ij
(t) = Y
F
ji
(t):
In this case, the matching game simulates the process on the marriage market between
single males and females during one year. Applying the matching model in this way clearly
provides a more intuitive and better description of reality. On the other hand, the model
becomes slightly more complicated. Notice that the original approach represents the special
case of the above situation, in which 
ij
= 1 for all combinations i; j.
Since each category is supposed to represent a one-year age class, the dimension of the
model may become very high. Thus, in practice, it may be a fruitful strategy to reduce the
dimension by assuming that each category represents several one-year age groups. However,
it is not obvious how to adjust the above formulas to cope with this situation. In this case
some of the individuals will remain in the same category, while others will not. One possible
way to treat this problem is to initially assume that all the individuals remain in the same
category (and thus adjust the above formulas according to this). Thereafter we use the
agening rates between age groups to compute how many (single, married and total) that
should be moved to the next category. In the next section we present another way to treat
this problem.
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Appendix B: Inclusion of agening rates
In this section we shall consider an alternative way to reduce the number of age groups in
the demographic model presented in the former section. Let 
M
i
; 
F
j
be the agening rates of
males in age group i and females in age group j respectively, that is, the probability that
a male of category i (or female of category j) at a given time t will remain in age class i
(j) at time t+ 1 (for simplicity reasons we suppose these rates to be constant in time). To
simplify our notation we also dene
X
ij
(t)  X
ij
(
~
M(t);
~
F (t)):
Then the agening of the total male population (in age group i) may be expressed as (we
have a similar expression for the female population):
M
i
(t+ 1) = 
M
i

M
i
M
i
(t) + (1  
M
i 1
)
M
i 1
M
i 1
(t)(4.1)
where i > 1. For age class one we must include the number of newborn (which may be
written as a linear combination of the number of marriages):
M
1
(t+ 1) = 
M
1

M
1
M
1
(t) + 
X
k;l

kl
Y
M
kl
:(4.2)
The population of single males in age group i at time t + 1 will now be equal to the single
males in age group i at time t not getting married who still are in age class i at time t + 1
plus the divorced males in age group i at time t still being in category i plus the single males
in age group i   1 at time t not getting married and becoming a member of age class i at
time t + 1 plus the divorced males in age group i   1 at time t being agened to category i
at time t+ 1. This yields the following updating rule:
~
M
i
(t+ 1) = 
M
i

M
i
[
~
M
i
(t) 
X
j
(X
ij
(t)  
ij
Y
M
ij
(t))]
+ (1  
M
i 1
)
M
i 1
[
~
M
i 1
(t) 
X
j
(X
i 1;j
(t)  
i 1;j
Y
M
i 1;j
(t))]:(4.3)
Again, in the special case i = 1, we must remove the entries involving age class i   1, and
include the number of newborn (males). Of course, all newborn are supposed to be single;
hence
~
M
1
(t+ 1) = 
M
1

M
1
[
~
M
1
(t) 
X
j
(X
1;j
(t)  
1;j
Y
M
1;j
(t))] + 
X
k;l

kl
Y
M
kl
(t):(4.4)
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To compute the number of married males of category i with females of category j at time
t + 1 we must include four cases: Marriages between males in age group i and females in
age group j at time t still being in the same category at time t + 1, marriages between
males in age group i  1 and females in age group j where the males are agened, marriages
between males of age i and females of category j   1 where the females are agened, and
nally marriages between males in age group i   1 and females in age group j   1 where
both are agened. This yields the following formula:
Y
M
i;j
(t+ 1) = 
M
i

F
j

M
i
[X
ij
(t) + (1  
ij
)Y
M
ij
(t)]
+ 
M
i
(1  
F
j 1
)
M
i
[X
i;j 1
(t) + (1  
i;j 1
)Y
M
i;j 1
(t)]
+ (1  
M
i 1
)
F
j

M
i 1
[X
i 1;j
(t) + (1  
i 1;j
)Y
M
i 1;j
(t)]
+ (1  
M
i 1
)(1  
F
j 1
)
M
i 1
[X
i 1;j 1
(t) + (1  
i 1;j 1
)Y
M
i 1;j 1
(t)](4.5)
where i; j > 1. In the special case where i or j = 1, we must as before remove the entries
indexed by i  1 or j   1 respectively:
Special case I, i = 1; j > 1:
Y
M
1;j
(t+ 1) = 
M
1

F
j

M
1
[X
1;j
(t) + (1  
1;j
)Y
M
1;j
(t)]
+ 
M
1
(1  
F
j 1
)
M
1
[X
1;j 1
(t) + (1  
1;j 1
)Y
M
1;j 1
(t)]:(4.6)
Special case II, i > 1; j = 1:
Y
M
i;1
(t+ 1) = 
M
i

F
1

M
i
[X
i;1
(t) + (1  
i;1
)Y
M
i;1
(t)]
+ (1  
M
i 1
)
F
1

M
i 1
[X
i 1;1
(t) + (1  
i 1;1
)Y
M
i 1;1
(t)]:(4.7)
Special case III, i = 1; j = 1:
Y
M
1;1
(t+ 1) = 
M
1

F
1

M
1
[X
1;1
(t) + (1  
1;1
)Y
M
1;1
(t)]:(4.8)
Similarly to the former case, we could verify the formulas (4.3) and (4.5) and their corre-
sponding special cases (4.4), (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8), by rst summing (4.5) over all age groups
j of females, and observing that a lot of the entries are cancelling out each other. Adding
the result of this computation to (4.3) yields the right hand side of (4.1) (or (4.2)), the total
male population in age group i at time t + 1, as it should be. We have similar formulas as
(4.3) and (4.5) for the female population as well. The above formulas may be used to dene
an alternative demographic model, where each category may consist of several one-year age
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classes. This will reduce the dimension of the model. On the other hand, this approach
requires a knowledge of the agening parameters 
M
i
; 
F
j
(these may be estimated using de-
mographic data), and the inclusion of these will increase the dimension of the parameter
space. We have implemented the above conguration and run a few simulations. However,
the results so far have not been signicantly dierent from the original version, indicating
that the inclusion of divorces in the model does not alter the qualitative behaviour of the
model to any extent.
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Appendix C. Simulation Results
Small sample and robustness properties of the marriage model
Recall that (3.1) to (3.5) represents the asymptotic number of marriages. Hence, it is
of great interest to analyze the robustness and small sample properties of the marriage
model. To investigate these properties, we have implemented the marriage model using the
mathematical software GAUSS from Aptech Inc on a UNIX workstation (SUN SPARC)
at Statistics Norway. The choice of language may not have been optimal with respect to
the speed of the simulation. However, the choice of programming language is made partly
because of our own experience from programming in GAUSS, and partly because GAUSS
provides the possibility of vectorization of the program code, making the programs more
compact. We have simulated versions of the model with dierent assumptions about the
probability distributions of the random terms of the utility functions of the women and men.
The motivation for this is that it is of great interest to nd out to which extent the
predictions of the model are robust with respect to alternative probability distributions
of the disturbances of the utility functions, and the introduction of exible contracts. To
throw some light on these questions, we have run several simulation experiments, using the
dierent versions of the model.
We have done three series of simulations. In series one, we have considered the simple
case of only one category of both males and females, and no exible contract. In series
two we considered the case of two age groups of both males and females, and two exible
contracts. In the last simulation series, we considered only one age group of each sex,
but we allowed three dierent contracts. In all the experiments, we ran 1000 simulations,
unless otherwise denoted in the tables displaying the results (in a couple of experiments, the
simulation speed was very slow, so we abrupted the simulation before 1000 simulations were
completed). In every case we carried out the simulations using two dierent probability
distributions on the disturbance of the utility functions; the extreme value distribution and
the log normal distribution. Tables with simulation results are presented below. Some of
the results were also reported in Dagsvik [1998].
In general, the results of the simulations show that the small sample predictions are close
to the asymptotic ones. This is particularly the case when using extreme value distributed
disturbances. A few of the simulations gave poor results, especially the case of a large ratio
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( 1 or  1) between the number of males and females (in a given age group) combined
with the assumption of log normal distributed disturbances. It is not easy to point out a
reason for this.
Table C1: Simulation series I - one category of men and women
Number in Preference Number of marriages
each category parameters Predicted Simulated
M F a b X Extr.val.(st.dev.) Normal(st.dev.)
50 50 1/7 1/7 19.273 18.05 (3.0) 16.18 (2.7)
50 150 1/7 1 31.44 30.17 (3.3) 25.49 (3.1)
60 80 1 0.5 55.48 54.56 (2.0) 54.12 (?)
30 15 1 1 14.11 13.58 (1.1) 13.72 (1.3)
30 20 0.25 1 15.64 14.67 (1.7) 14.12 (1.7)
15 20 1/6 1/8 3.79 3.32 (1.5) 3.5 (1.5)
10 15 1/9 1/3 3.07 2.57 (1.3) 2.4 (1.2)
15 90 1/20 1 11.94 10.05 (1.7) 6.54 (2.0)
20 40 1/3 1/4 13.73 12.72 (2.0) 12.56 (2.1)
10 5 0.5 1 3.78 3.32 (1.0) 3.22 (0.9)
80 40 1 0.2 35.92 33.78 (2.1) 30.23 (2.7)
30 70 1/30 1/7 6.93 6.25 (2.0) 4.56 (1.8)
20 20 1/3 1/2 11.93 10.57 (1.8) 10.41 (1.9)
8 15 1/2 1/5 4.16 3.57 (1.3) 3.51 (1.3)
90 15 1 1/20 11.94 10.16 (1.7) 6.37 (1.9)
Simulation series II - two categories - two contracts
M
i
is the number of men in age group i, F
j
is the number of women in age group j, the
double index i; j indicates the matching between males from age group i with females of
age group j. a
ij
(!) is the preference parameters for a man from group i to be married
with a woman from age group j under the contract !. b
ji
(!) is the preference parameters
for a woman from group j to be married with a man from age group i under the contract !.
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Table C2: M
1
= 20;M
2
= 15, F
1
= 30; F
2
= 8.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 1:0 2:0 1:0 1:0 2:0 1:0 3:0 2:0
b
ji
(!) 4:0 3:0 0:5 1:0 1:0 0:5 1:0 3:0
Predicted 7.569 0.382 3.672 2.224 11.353 0.191 3.672 4.449
Extr.val. 7.055 0.574 3.801 2.22 11.348 0.326 3.797 3.947
St.dev. 2.1 0.7 1.5 1.2 2.2 0.5 1.5 1.4
Normal 5.649 0.359 3.667 2.137 13.284 0.167 3.424 4.609
St.dev. 2.0 0.6 1.5 1.3 2.1 0.4 1.5 1.4
Table C3: M
1
= 30;M
2
= 10, F
1
= 5; F
2
= 20.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 1:0 2:0 1:0 1:0 2:0 1:0 3:0 2:0
b
ji
(!) 4:0 3:0 0:5 1:0 1:0 0:5 1:0 3:0
Predicted 1.939 7.508 0.059 2.732 2.908 3.754 0.059 5.465
Extr.val. 2.194 7.437 0.065 2.548 2.578 3.679 0.086 5.487
St.dev. 1.1 1.8 0.3 1.4 1.1 1.6 0.3 1.5
Normal 2.484 7.815 0.015 2.336 2.459 2.462 0.022 6.494
St.dev. 1.1 1.7 0.1 1.4 1.1 1.4 0.2 1.6
Table C4: M
1
= 20;M
2
= 60, F
1
= 10; F
2
= 30.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 1:0 2:0 1:0 1:0 2:0 1:0 3:0 2:0
b
ji
(!) 4:0 3:0 0:5 1:0 1:0 0:5 1:0 3:0
Predicted 2.653 1.248 1.655 9.34 3.98 0.624 1.655 18.679
Extr.val. 2.997 1.651 1.448 7.899 3.383 0.896 2.048 19.275
St.dev. 1.4 1.2 1.1 2.4 1.5 0.9 1.3 2.6
Normal (922s) 4.347 0.732 0.372 3.898 4.131 0.148 1.077 25.109
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Table C5: M
1
= 15;M
2
= 20, F
1
= 10; F
2
= 15.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 1:0 2:0 1:0 1:0 2:0 1:0 3:0 2:0
b
ji
(!) 4:0 3:0 0:5 1:0 1:0 0:5 1:0 3:0
Predicted 3.229 1.299 0.883 4.263 4.843 0.65 0.883 8.527
Extr.val. 3.426 1.556 0.87 3.656 4.373 0.776 1.073 8.585
St.dev. 1.4 1.1 0.9 1.7 1.5 0.8 0.9 1.9
Normal 4.048 1.046 0.304 2.771 4.845 0.295 0.636 10.551
St.dev. 1.5 0.9 0.5 1.5 1.6 0.5 0.7 1.7
Table C6: M
1
= 20;M
2
= 15, F
1
= 30; F
2
= 8.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 5:0 4:0 0:5 0:5 1:0 1:0 8:0 7:0
b
ji
(!) 2:0 1:0 1:0 3:0 2:0 1:0 4:0 6:0
Predicted 13.992 0.084 1.718 3.31 5.569 0.042 5.154 4.345
Extr.val. 13.291 0.11 1.998 3.321 6.02 0.047 4.776 4.293
St.dev. 2.1 0.3 1.2 1.4 1.9 0.2 1.3 1.4
Normal (980s) 14.192 0.015 1.784 3.294 5.542 0.002 4.728 4.613
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Table C7: M
1
= 30;M
2
= 10, F
1
= 5; F
2
= 20.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 5:0 4:0 0:5 0:5 1:0 1:0 8:0 7:0
b
ji
(!) 2:0 1:0 1:0 3:0 2:0 1:0 4:0 6:0
Predicted 3.535 6.596 0.007 4.182 1.414 3.298 0.021 5.489
Extr.val. 3.234 6.536 0.03 4.183 1.571 3.34 0.073 5.347
St.dev. 1.1 1.7 0.2 1.5 1.1 1.6 0.3 1.6
Normal 3.854 7.127 0.004 4.292 1.068 2.551 0.024 5.586
St.dev. 0.9 1.5 0.1 1.6 0.9 1.4 0.2 1.6
Table C8: M
1
= 20;M
2
= 60, F
1
= 10; F
2
= 30.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 5:0 4:0 0:5 0:5 1:0 1:0 8:0 7:0
b
ji
(!) 2:0 1:0 1:0 3:0 2:0 1:0 4:0 6:0
Predicted 4.531 0.201 0.906 12.836 1.812 0.1 2.717 16.848
Extr.val. (300s) 2.767 0.83 1.497 11.93 1.413 0.4 4.24 16.717
Normal (323s) 2.935 0.331 0.731 9.699 0.755 0.049 5.529 19.913
Table C9: M
1
= 15;M
2
= 20, F
1
= 10; F
2
= 15.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 5:0 4:0 0:5 0:5 1:0 1:0 8:0 7:0
b
ji
(!) 2:0 1:0 1:0 3:0 2:0 1:0 4:0 6:0
Predicted 5.976 0.305 0.384 6.267 2.39 0.152 1.152 8.226
Extr.val. 4.84 0.791 0.665 5.667 2.232 0.439 1.999 7.935
St.dev. 1.4 0.8 0.8 1.9 1.3 0.6 1.1 1.9
Normal 5.585 0.464 0.419 5.263 1.638 0.116 2.17 9.1
St.dev. 1.5 0.6 0.6 1.8 1.1 0.3 1.1 1.9
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Table C10: M
1
= 20;M
2
= 15, F
1
= 30; F
2
= 8.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 4:0 4:0 1:5 0:5 2:0 1:0 1:0 1:0
b
ji
(!) 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 1:5 0:5 1:0 2:0
Predicted 8.268 2.258 6.098 1.481 8.268 0.251 3.049 2.961
Extr.val. 8.055 2.354 5.998 1.496 8.023 0.317 3.253 2.629
St.dev. 2.1 1.2 1.7 1.1 2.1 0.5 1.5 1.3
Normal 8.212 2.322 5.799 1.486 8.166 0.139 2.939 2.917
St.dev. 2.1 1.2 1.8 1.1 2.2 0.4 1.5 1.3
Table C11: M
1
= 30;M
2
= 10, F
1
= 5; F
2
= 20.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 4:0 4:0 1:5 0:5 2:0 1:0 1:0 1:0
b
ji
(!) 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 1:5 0:5 1:0 2:0
Predicted 2.181 12.558 0.363 1.856 2.181 1.395 0.181 3.713
Extr.val. 2.013 11.841 0.451 1.846 1.99 1.828 0.306 3.698
St.dev. 1.1 1.8 0.6 1.3 1.1 1.2 0.5 1.5
Normal 2.001 12.533 0.428 1.624 1.981 0.915 0.283 4.295
St.dev. 1.1 1.6 0.6 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.5 1.5
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Table C12: M
1
= 20;M
2
= 60, F
1
= 10; F
2
= 30.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 4:0 4:0 1:5 0:5 2:0 1:0 1:0 1:0
b
ji
(!) 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 1:5 0:5 1:0 2:0
Predicted 2.225 5.456 3.622 7.894 2.225 0.606 1.811 15.788
Extr.val. 1.68 5.11 3.829 8.059 1.659 0.815 2.582 15.6
St.dev. 1.2 1.8 1.5 2.4 1.2 0.8 1.3 2.7
Normal 1.642 5.136 3.718 5.532 1.668 0.262 2.482 18.78
St.dev. 1.2 1.8 1.5 2.1 1.1 0.5 1.4 2.5
Table C13: M
1
= 15;M
2
= 20, F
1
= 10; F
2
= 15.
Contract ! 1 2
Age index i; j 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
a
ij
(!) 4:0 4:0 1:5 0:5 2:0 1:0 1:0 1:0
b
ji
(!) 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 1:5 0:5 1:0 2:0
Predicted 2.988 4.416 2.44 3.205 2.988 0.491 1.22 6.411
Extr.val. 2.641 4.372 2.598 3.146 2.525 0.655 1.558 6.109
St.dev. 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.3 0.7 1.1 1.7
Normal 2.482 4.546 2.489 2.686 2.539 0.355 1.516 6.866
St.dev. 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.6 1.1 1.7
Simulation series III - one category, three exible contracts
Table C14: M = 30; F = 25.
Contract ! 1 2 3
a(!) 5:0 4:0 3:0
b(!) 2:0 1:5 2:5
Predicted 10.552 6.331 7.914
Extr.val. (St.dev.) 9.679 (2.4) 6.241 (2.2) 8.658 (2.4)
Normal (St.dev.) 9.731 (2.6) 5.201 (2.1) 9.844 (2.6)
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